The Constitutional Court of Indonesia is considered one of Asia's most activist courts. Here we investigate empirically possible determinants of the decisions of its judges over the period 2003-18. The findings are based on a unique data set of 80 high-profile political cases, complemented by data on the socio-biographic profiles of 26 judges who served during that period. Testing for common perceptions of the Constitutional Court since its inception, we first describe patterns in judicial decision-making across time and court composition before testing specifically for the impact of the judges' professional backgrounds, presidential administrations, the influence of the Chief Justice, and cohort behaviour. The analysis finds declining dissent among justices on the bench over time and also provides evidence of strategic behaviour of justices at the ending of their own terms. But there is little statistical evidence that judicial behaviour has been affected by work background (except for those coming from the executive branch), appointment track or generation -hence suggesting that justices seem to retain more independence than the public seems to perceive. We then discuss the results in the context of Indonesia's evolving constitutional democracy and look at the implications for comparative studies of judicial behaviour.
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts have become major players in Asia's evolving political arenas. As countries in the region democratised and liberalised over the last 25 years, since the 1990s there has been growing judicial involvement and assertiveness in political matters. This has contributed to claims that in the region politics is becoming ever more judicialized, 1 a trend that has been well-documented for some time in other parts of the world.
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The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia (Mahkamah Konstitusi, MK) is a good illustration for this trend. In the past 15 years, the MK has revised seventy-four laws, annulled four completely, and nullified portions in the course of granting just over a quarter of all petitions. Perhaps more important, it has not shied away from political controversy; in fact some of its high-profile decisions are recognised as having had major political and economic repercussions; for instance it has invalidated the privatisation of electricity utilities; condemned government budgets that failed to allocate sufficient funds for education, and protected religious, ethnic and sexual minorities from government discrimination.
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Combined with its regular engagement in contested electoral matters, it is thus not surprising that the court is considered unusually activist.
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Such high-level engagement, although vulnerable to the dangers shown by the constitutional court in Thailand, 5 seem to have done little to impugn the reputation of the Indonesian court. Much to the contrary, relying on its initial leadership and a 'built up stock of political capital because of its apparent integrity 1 and good faith' 6 over the years, the court has experienced a 'remarkable rise' 7 in public standing and found wide support in public opinion polls, despite a short, abrupt, but temporary drop in 2013 after its Chief Justice, Akil Mochtar, was arrested. 8 As a result, together with the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK), it is one of the most respected institutions in the country 9 -one that has been widely credited with helping the country's democratic consolidation. what is perceived to be an increasingly politicized appointment process, 12 and academics have expressed concerns about a decline in leadership 13 and the quality of decisions in terms of legal reasoning, consistency and the evidence base in high-profile cases. 14 In general, then, the perception seems to be growing that An IFES poll in 2005 showed that 68% approved the court (with 11% disapproving); a number that dropped to 28% when the Mochtar scandal broke (see, https://www.ifes.org/surveys/public-opinion-indonesia-2005). A 2018 LSI poll shows trust in the MK at 76%, only surpassed by TNI (90.4%); KPK (89%); National Police (87%) and BPK (79%); see for results: https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/07/31/17242921/survei-lsi-dpr-lembaganegara-dengan-tingkat-kepercayaan-terendah.
9
See Kompas survey at: https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/10/21/07122651/survei-kompas-citra-tni-naikhingga-94-persen-citra-dpr-terendah. 10 Marcus Mietzner, "Political Conflict and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia: The Role of the Constitutional Court," Journal of East Asian Studies 10, no. 3 (2010) .
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See "Judicial Mafia: Corruption as a barrier to justice in Indonesia", found at: https://www.ibj.org/2010/08/13/ judicial-mafia-corruption-as-a-barrier-to-justice-in-indonesia. 12 See, "Justice appointment 'a setback to democracy', Jakarta Post (July 31, 2013) hearing electoral disputes (Art. 24C(1)), and deciding on motions to impeach the president or vice president (Art 24C(2)). Later laws to curtail some of these powers have not only been rejected by the MK but also countered by its broad interpretation of its powers, 26 which led some observers to wonder if the court had morphed from the envisioned 'negative' legislator to a 'positive' legislator despite attempts at self-restraint (e.g., review limited to norms, prospectivity).
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Safeguards for judicial independence are strong -at least formally. The law provides for both a multiple-track appointment system and budget autonomy. Undang-undang or Perpu) that would require justices to have had no links to a political party for seven years and to undergo screening by an independent selection panel. 31 However, in 2014 the court rejected this Perpu in its entirety.
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The court has had a high workload for the last 15 years. This is because the number of cases filed has gradually increased, with considerable spikes during election times when the court has to deal with large amounts of disputes related to local as well as presidential and legislative elections (see figure 1 ). Judicial review cases also steadily increased, though they have plateaued over the last five years. On average, about 25 percent of these petitions are granted; on average the court has rejected outright more than a third of the petitions -a trend that has been rising in the last five years, together with some applications becoming 'non-acceptable' (figure 2). concern for court reputation; a common objective to empower the court over competing political and judicial actors). Party politics may also be relevant (for example, loyalty to the appointer). Finally, these variables interact in a specific constitutional and doctrinal environment, some with more, others with less legal formalism.
The relative importance of these variables varies with explanatory theory.
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For instance, the legal model assumes that judges decide in conformity with laws and precedent. 41 Fostering an image of judges as neutral and apolitical, they use technical interpretation skills to ascertain the law that best applies to the specific case. 42 Other approaches portray judges as individuals with discernible political motivations-attitudinal models argue that ideological positions and policy preferences shape judicial decisions, especially in courts of last resort.
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They downplay the influence of law and portray judges as focused on legal policy. 44 The strategic model of judicial decision-making, also guided by the notion of judicial policy preferences, acknowledges that judges take into account the views of other actors and the institutional context, and may even deviate from a preferred outcome to take those views into account.
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A full discussion of these theories is beyond the scope of this paper. 49 The attitudinal model, which assumes that judicial behaviour takes the form of sincere ideological voting due to the combination of life tenure, no judicial superiors, docket control, and no career ambition, seems ill-adapted to the MK bench given mandatory retirement age, limited docket control, renewed appointments and post-judicial career trajectories. 
IV. DATA SET AND METHODS

We analysed and coded 80 decisions issued by the Constitutional Court of
Indonesia from 2004 to 2018 (see Appendix). As explained earlier, we included only cases that are (mega)political, chosen based on (1) coverage on the front page of two major newspapers; (2) citations in publications about the MK;
and (3) vetting by local experts. Megapolitical cases are of particular interest here because we expect personal and political factors to become particularly important to decision making due to the nature of the issues and the weaker doctrinal basis for decisions in these matters.
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The individual votes of each justice in the 80 cases give us 710 observations.
The outcome of interest, the dependent variable in the regression analysis, is a vote against the administration in power. We also amassed socio-biographic data for the 26 judges who voted in these cases, such as time on the bench, university affiliation and year of graduation, and professional career and workplace before appointment.
V. FINDINGS
The Bench
The under Joko Widodo (see Table 1 ). During the sample period, a third of MK positions were consistently assigned to career justices, consistent with the nomination pathway from the Supreme Court. Justices with experience in the executive branch before ascending to the bench are the second largest group (though this group fell to zero in the middle of the sample period). Justices with a legislative background reached a maximum of seven, though currently none is on the bench. Interestingly, throughout the same period there is always at least one MK justice with a scholarly background (perhaps a minor consequence of the PhD requirement), and scholars seem to be equally likely to have been nominated by parliament or the president. By contrast, there seems to be a slight preference for presidential appointees to themselves come from the executive office. Only two of the justices reappointed were nominated by two different institutions (see Table 2 ). Combined, our data reveals a highly diverse (notably except for gender) 50 and a relative stable bench over the sample period. Unlike other high courts in the region (e.g., Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia), appointments to the bench are not dominated by certain universities, nor is the pathway limited to certain work backgrounds (e.g., career judiciary). Much of this may be a direct result of the mixed appointment process that -although it may be increasingly politicized -has also allowed for a diverse group of judges who meet the vetting process and selection criteria to be appointed.
Voting Patterns, 2004-18
The number of megapolitical cases rose gradually over time, except for surges in 2008 and 2014 due to elections. This is also reflected in the distribution of cases by category; almost a third of cases dealt with electoral disputes (28%) and slightly more with rights and civil liberties (33%); the rest related to separation of powers (24%), economics (9%) and executive prerogatives (6%). Although 39 cases (49%) had at least one dissenter, the remaining 41 were decided unanimously (51%).
Only 80 cases (of a total sample of 89) were considered relevant to this study. Of these, the Constitutional Court decided almost 75% against and only 25% for the sitting government. In cases involving separation of 50 Recent appointment of Justice Enny Nurbaningsih by president Joko Widodo as replacement for retiring justice Maria Farida Indrati from a female-only shortlist of candidates might be seen as a growing awareness of gender imbalance on the bench.
powers (80%) and executive prerogatives (80%) the court voted most often against the government; the majority of cases dealing with economic issues were decided (57%) for the government.
Overall, the MK granted 83% of the petitions in our sample. This number is significantly higher than the total of petitions received during this period (e.g., roughly a quarter), but this might also be because since 2005 the Court has granted a growing number of petitions only partially, as part of its rulings of cases as 'conditionally' unconstitutional (48% of the petitions granted in our sample). This tendency has increased over time, and become particularly pronounced under Chief Justice Arief Hidayat: of 23 decisions during his tenure, 15 were judged conditionally (un)constitutional (see Table 4 ). As for the average dissent rate of the bench -here defined as the number of anti-administration votes over total votes -there are two peaks, one in the first third of the sample, and the other in the last third. In fact, early in the sample period, anti-administration votes reached 80%, but gradually dropped to 55%; it then rose about 90% in 2012 before easing to about 50% in 2018. Overall, anti-administration rates differed depending on who was president. During the last third of the sample, the rates declined gradually, perhaps because doctrinal positions were more established. Note: Note: Average dissent rates for the bench are calculated by taking a simple average of case-specific dissent rates. Dissent rate takes one when justices voted against the administration in power unanimously; zero when justices voted for the administration unanimously.
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Equally interesting is the fact that the dispersion of decisions among MK justices as measured by standard deviation declined over the sample period and decisions have become increasingly unanimous ( Figure 3 ).
Figure 3: Dispersion of Decisions on the Bench
Note: A standard deviation of votes by bench is used as a measure of dispersion. The red line is calculated by taking 11-case centered moving average of dispersion by case.
In short, while there is little ground to suggest that the court has become more likely to vote for the government (as it is sometimes suggested in public discourse), it is certainly true that there is less disagreement among the justices. This is particularly true since 2014 with Joko Widodo as president (last 24 cases). There are also sharp differences in dissents under CJ Hamdan Zoelva and CJ Arief Hidayat, which might perhaps suggest the CJ has a subtle influence on the voting patterns of MK (though short CJ tenures also limit that).
Individual Voting and Regression Findings
What about behavioural differences between individual justices? A closer look at their voting records reveals sharp differences in votes for and against the government (see Table 6 ). Roestandi dissented in half of the cases he was involved in, and Justices I Dewa Gede Palguna and Ahmad Syarifuddin Natabaya did so in almost a third of their cases. Perhaps even more interesting is that Justices Hamdan Zoelva and Jimly Asshiddiqie never dissented from the majority, closely followed by Justices Anwar Usman, Muhammad Alim, and Arief Hidayat (Table 7) . That four of these five were also CJ during their tenure suggests that Chief Justices have an important role in marshalling these majorities. Such differences then raise a broad question: do individual traits shape the voting patterns of MK justices? In other words, can we associate the variation of voting behaviour with the character of justices?
To find out we engage in some basic inferential statistics. Our dependent variable is binary, with a value of one if the vote is against the administration in power or zero if not. Independent variables are:
• Tenure remaining_as_President: the number of years left for the current president, assuming two terms for SBY and Jokowi .
• Tenure remaining_as_Justice: the remaining number of years as justice.
• Appointing institution dummy variables: setting the Supreme Court as a benchmark.
• Job prior to appointment dummy variables: setting judiciary background as a benchmark.
• Chief Justice dummy variables: setting the period of CJ Asshiddiqie as a benchmark.
• Generation dummy variable: setting the justices in the first generation as a benchmark.
Since we draw on 710 votes by the 26 justices in 80 cases from 2004 to 2018, the panel data structure is highly unbalanced; the votes of individual justices ranged from 5 to 61, and the average was 28.4 votes. We therefore fitted a random effects Probit model and estimated the parameters by maximum likelihood. The results are presented in Table 8 . 
Notes:
The dummy variables take one if a justice corresponds to the specified category, zero otherwise. For each classification of dummy variables, the benchmark category is explained in the text.
Model-1: Baseline Regression
The findings reported in Table 5 are broadly in line with findings in the literature. The coefficient of Remaining Tenure of President has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level. That means the closer the end of the administration, the more likely that justices will vote against it. Similarly, the coefficient for Remaining Tenure as Justice is negative and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that the closer justices get to retirement, the more likely they are to vote against the administration. These findings are broadly in line with reported strategic behaviour (including strategic defection). Perhaps most interesting is the fact that none of the appointing pathways is statistically significant, though the direction differs.
In other words, it does not matter what institution appointed the judge, though those appointed by parliament and by president are slightly more likely than career judges to vote with the government.
Model-2: Does Work Background Matter?
Model 2 replaces information about the appointing institution with previous work background in the estimation. Interesting here that, although the direction is negative, only executive background is statistically significant at the 5% level, which means that justices who before their appointment had worked for the executive were more likely to vote with the current government.
Model-3: Does the Chief Justice Influence Decisions?
Model 3 While we present evidence for strategic behaviour (if not defection) of justices toward the end of a presidential term, and closer to a justice's retirement, we do not find any evidence for differences in judicial behaviour by appointment track, generation, or work background (except for justices from the executive branch). In short, in ruling on the 80 high-profile political cases in our sample, the voting behaviour of the justices may have been more independent than academics and the public are willing to credit.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Constitutional Court of Indonesia makes for a fascinating study of judicial behaviour. Often considered perhaps the most activist court in the region, in the last fifteen years the MK has nevertheless earned considerable acclaim within Indonesia's highly dysfunctional legal system. When adjudicating highly charged political matters, it has survived many challenges from within and outside, even as it limited its decision-making in some ways and radically expanded it in others. However, some decisions, and above all corruption scandals, have heightened public concerns and raised a number of questions about its competence, if not impartiality, in politically charged cases.
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Taking widespread public and academic concerns as a starting point, this paper offers one of the first empirical accounts of the MK's judicial behaviour in high-profile political cases. Such megapolitical cases are particular suitable for this type of investigation; it is reasonable to assume that strategic behaviour and attitudinal positions come to the fore given the nature and uncertain legal basis of many of the cases. It is our hope that our findings, while certainly no replacement for legal-interpretivist scholarship, offer a much-needed empirically grounded, and ultimately more nuanced, perspective on the performance of the MK in its first 15 years.
In our carefully selected sample, we found little evidence to support some of the most common claims. For instance, while it is true that there is less dissent among justices on the bench over time, it is not clear that the court is deciding less often against government than previously. And while there is evidence of strategic behaviour of justices as the ending of their own terms and that of a president approach, there is little statistical evidence that judicial behaviour has been affected by work background (except for those coming from the executive branch), appointment track or generation. What this suggests is that despite an increasingly politicised nomination process, justices seem to retain more independence than the public seems to perceive -their personal characteristics do not seem to influence the pattern of votes for and against the government.
There is much room for speculation on why this might be. As shown in the diversity and stability on the bench, despite obvious shortcomings, clearly the mixed appointment process has been able to limit the ability of the executive to stack the court as has happened in the Philippines 53 and other authoritarian regimes in the region. Paradoxically, the competitive clientelist party systemwhile perhaps partly to blame for declining quality in justice selection processes -has also ensured that nomination has remained competitive and is relatively 53 Björn Dressel and Tomoo Inoue, "Informal Networks and Judicial Decisions: Insights from the Philippines Supreme Court, 1986 ," International Political Science Review 39, no. 1 (2018 transparent to civil society 54 -unlike what has happened in Thailand, where the military regime has gradually gained control over not only nominations to the Constitutional Court but also ultimately over its decision-making process.
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Compared to such neighbours, the MK seems to be doing rather well.
To be sure, given developments in the region the situation can change quickly; and the judiciary remains vulnerable to attempts to politicize the courts. 56 Recent corruption scandals in particular illustrate that no matter what institutional safeguards are in place, courts in the region remain deeply enmeshed in clientelist-political structures, including informal practices of obligation and loyalty that might affect the work behaviour of justices on even the highest courts. 57 These factors, while often hard to grasp empirically, deserve more scholarly attention, 58 and certainly need to become part of a broader empirical research agenda on courts throughout the Global South. 59 The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia surely deserves continuing attention. How it exercises its role and guards its powers in years to come will be crucial to how the rule of law and judicial practice evolve not only in Indonesia but throughout a region confronted by consistent challenges to rule-based practice. 60 Though not always perfect, the MK has certainly done well considering not only the regional context but also the institutional environment in which it operates. It is our hope that this study helps capture its remarkable achievement, and provides a much-needed evidential benchmark for continuing critical evaluation.
